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The article aims to identify the role of 
the Baltic factor in Russian-French rela-
tions. Despite the fact that the Baltic Sea 
region (BSR) no longer plays an impor-
tant role in Russian-French bilateral rela-
tions, the authors attach significance to 
analysing the dynamics and changes of 
the BSR role in European politics in the 
post-Napoleonic period. The authors com-
pare the Russian and the July Monarchies 
(1830—1848) in the context of the current 
Vienna system of international relations. 
The article describes the role of the 
1830—1831 uprising in Poland, which 
was an event of particular importance. 
The monarchies of the two countries had 
to take into account new social phenome-
na, which were more pronounced in Fran-
ce. After the suppression of the uprising in 
the Polish part of the Russian Empire, 
Polish emigrants residing in France beca-
me the stumbling block to the development 
of Russian-French relations. The article 
explores the role of P. de Barante, Am-
bassador of France to Russia and de-
scribes France and Russia’s trade and 
economic interests in the Baltic Sea re-
gion. The authors conclude that the speci-
ficity of Russian-French bilateral rela-
tions became more apparent during the 
First and Second World Wars. However, 
the Baltic factor has lost its relevance 
over time. 
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Introduction 
 
After the Congress of Vienna, the 
Baltic question came to the fore in 
Russian-French relations. It concerned 
opportunities for strengthening the 
countries’ positions in the region, a 
series of disagreements between Euro-
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pean states, and the aspiration of Russia and France to gain a potential ally 
and unite against a common enemy. In the 19th century, the Baltic question 
took on a new significance. The germs of the Baltic question are found in the 
international relations of the post-Order period — the 16th/17th centuries — 
when the region became a platform for cooperation between different pow-
ers, including Russia. In the early 18th century, the Baltic question was con-
sidered in Russian-French relations in the maritime context. However, in the 
19th century, the focus shifted to the Polish problem. Poland was always im-
portant for both Russia and France and the Polish question would often be-
come an obstacle to the bilateral relations. 
 
The Polish aspect of Russian-French relations 
 
In 1807, under the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon I established the Duchy of 
Poland from territories ceded to Prussia and the Austrian Empire by the Sec-
ond and Third Partitions of Poland. The Duchy, which became a French pro-
tectorate, existed until 1813, when the forces of the Sixth Coalition con-
quered it. The Congress of Vienna assigned most of the territory of the 
Duchy to Russia as an autonomous Kingdom of Poland. 
The Polish question was reopened in 1830 when a revolutionary wave 
generated by the French revolution swept over Europe, leading to the anti-
Russian uprising in Warsaw. The rebellion complicated the already tense 
French-Russian relations. Nicholas I was an avid opponent of the July Revo-
lution. He considered Louis-Philippe I a usurper who had ‘stolen' the crown 
from the young grandson of Charles X, the duke of Bordeaux. Only after 
England, Austria, Prussia, and other European states had recognised the July 
monarchy, Nicholas I changed his position. At first, the Russian Emperor 
was inspired by the idea of an armed intervention in France to restore the 
rule of Charles X. Many French authors would stress in the national press 
that the Polish uprising had forestalled a war between Russia and France. 
The attention of Nicholas I was focused on Warsaw — without subduing the 
Poles, it would have been more than unwise to move west. 
The Polish uprising also became a serious political problem for France — 
a country that traditionally supported Polish aspirations to regain national 
independence. Despite widespread anti-Russian and pro-Polish sentiment in 
the French society, Louis Philippe and his supporters — liberal Orleanists — 
had a clear understanding that France could have returned to the club of 
great powers only if it had abandoned its attempts at forced spreading of lib-
eral ideas and revising the Vienna system. The position on the Polish upris-
ing taken by King Louis-Philippe and his government headed by the banker 
Jacques Laffite was a consistent refusal to provide military support for Poles. 
The Polish question was closely connected to the territorial integrity interests 
of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Having authorised a revision of the Vienna 
system in the Belgian case, European monarchs clearly understood that, in 
the case of Poland, securing peace in Europe would be impossible without 
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maintaining status quo. As the Russian scholar V. V. Degoev stresses, both 
Paris and London understood this too well to let the feeling of solidarity with 
Poles prevail over the feeling of realism [4, p. 216]. 
On March 13, 1831, Laffite’s Ministry, which was closely connected to 
the French financial circles and sympathised with Poles, was replaced by the 
Ministry of Casimir Périer, who — in keeping with the King’s intentions — 
refused even to discuss the military support for Poles. All this was greeted 
with enthusiasm by the Russian cabinet. As early as January 1831, the Am-
bassador of Russia to France, Corsican C. A. Pozzo di Borgo wrote, ‘The 
current disposition of the government regarding the Polish affairs is the most 
that we can do. I have received all possible assurances that France will not 
intervene in the Polish questions on any pretext’ (AVPRI 133/469/197/111). 
Stressing the moderation and cautiousness of Casimir Périer's government, 
the diplomat believed that ‘a war will not begin during his tenure as Minis-
ter' (AVPRI 133/469/198/62). 
The Polish appeals to the French government were heard. However, 
sympathies expressed were mere declarations. Paris understood that a mili-
tary intervention to protect Poles was fraught with a major destabilisation in 
international relations and national affairs. As Pozzo di Borgo stressed, Lou-
is-Philippe would have never intervened in the Polish crisis under any pre-
tence (AVPRI 133/469/197/105, 107). 
Polish patriots had close connections with their supporters in France. 
Various civic organisations and committees were established and attempts 
were made to raise funds to support the rebels. However, these endeavours 
were futile [1; 7]. 
Throughout the year 1831, the French were closely observing the course 
of warfare. The Polish question was becoming an important factor in domes-
tic politics, which was not overlooked by the government. From the begin-
ning of September, front pages were featuring coverage of the Polish events. 
On September 16, 1831 Paris newspapers announced the capture of Warsaw 
by the Russian forces and the defeat of the Poles. Anti-Russian rallies 
sweeping over the French capital required an intervention from the army. 
Pozzo di Borgo's associates insisted that he leave France but he decided to 
stay and his decision preserved the diplomatic relations between France and 
Russia. In that situation, the departure of the ambassador would have led to 
the severance of relations between the two countries. As a contemporary of 
the events in question stressed, only Pozzo di Borgo's moderation and 
shrewdness had saved the relations between the two states [11]. 
Louis-Philippe striving to strengthen and stabilise his regime refrained 
from a military intervention in the Polish affairs. However, France became 
the greatest target of Polish emigration. Most commoners — soldiers, peas-
ants, servants — settled in Galicia and Prussia. The rest continued farther to 
the West — to Switzerland, Belgium, England, and predominantly France. 
In the early 1830s, the central problem of bilateral relations was the 
Polish uprising and the French position on the issue. In the mid-1830s, the 
Polish emigrants in France became the most contentious issue. Polish emi-
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grant organisations in France caused serious concerns and constant com-
plaints from the Russian government. The Vice-chancellor, Count Nessel-
rode, accused the French government of supporting Polish emigrants, in par-
ticular, Prince Czartoryski. 
At the same time, the French government was seriously concerned with 
the Poles staying in France. As early as November 1831, Casimir Périer’s 
government, striving to remove the unruly Poles from the capital, issued a 
circulaire forbidding the Poles entrance to Paris. The Polish emigrants were 
lodged at first in two large and later several dozen smaller groups in provin-
cial French towns, where the ‘Polish depots' were created. Paris became 
home to the richest and, as a rule, most moderate emigrants [7]. 
Although the French tried to restrict the activities of the Polish emigrants 
by law, Russia considered these steps insufficient believing that France had 
made a mistake having offered asylum to the Poles. In a conversation with 
the ambassador of France to Russia in 1835—1841, Baron de Barante, Count 
Nesselrode emphasised that France had treated Russia with less amiability 
than Russia had France, since the French government had admitted the 
Poles, whereas the Emperor had never received nor listened to the Legiti-
mists1 and had always rejected all their proposals. Indeed, de Barante made 
several reports of such démarches by the Russian Emperor. In particular, on 
May 4, 1839, he informed the head of the government Louis-Mathieu Molé 
that Nicholas I had refused to receive the French Legitimist Paire carrying 
letters from duchess de Berry [6]. 
Overall, the cautious and moderate Polish policy of the French govern-
ment was welcomed in Russia. In particular, on May 21, 1836, baron de Ba-
rante informed Louis-Adolphe Thiers — who had been appointed the head 
of the cabinet and Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 22 — that the 
Emperor had been satisfied with the measures taken by the French govern-
ment to restrict organised Polish immigration. However, he never refrained 
from stressing his attitude to Poland and intimidating the Ambassador [6]. 
From his early years, Nicholas I, whо learnt his hatred for the Poles from 
his instructress Englishwoman Miss Lyon, was very sensitive to all things 
Polish. De Barante wrote that Poland had been the Emperor’s primary con-
cern [10]. On September 8, 1836, the Ambassador described the feelings of 
Nicholas I as follows: ‘It is not often that the winner bears such sheer malice 
and such arrogant contempt for the defeated’. The diplomat believed that the 
Emperor saw his mission in ‘turning Poland into a Russian province and 
wiping out any trace of its national spirit… its language and religion’. Ac-
cording to the Ambassador, Nicholas would often say, ‘It is a question of 
seven decades if there are no interruptions’ [6]. 
De Barante himself was deeply impressed by the Poles living in Russia, 
their independent demeanour and open criticism of the Russian govern-
ment’s politics. In his Notes sur la Russie, he stressed the inner freedom of 
Poles, especially, women, who expressed their hatred for Russia freely and 
fearlessly [9]. 
                                                     
1 The Legitimists supported the rights of succession of the duke of Bordeaux. 
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Russia, France, and the Baltic region 
 
During his unprecedented time in office, baron de Barante made interest-
ing and important observations about Russia and its politics. Valuable in-
formation is found in his reports on Russia’s position in the Baltic. The Am-
bassador used to accompany the Emperor, who admired all the things mili-
tary, on manoeuvres in Krasnoye Selo and Kronstadt — Russia's outpost in 
the Baltic. Emperor Nicholas was very proud of the Russian navy. When he 
demonstrated the might of the navy to the Ambassador, the emperor never 
missed an opportunity to intimidate de Barante by showing his attitude to 
King Louis Philippe, whom the diplomat represented. 
In mid-June 1836, the Ambassador was present at the inspection of 
twenty-six three-deck ships, which was also visited by the emperor and his 
family. Studying the list of ships, de Barante noticed an interesting detail — 
most ships had been named after Russian victories over the French. The Em-
peror watched the Ambassador carefully studying the list, came up to him, 
and said amiably, ‘I think you still have troubles with reading Russian. Let 
me help you’. The ship with the proud name Berezina topped the list. Nicho-
las, trying to downplay the impression, appeased the Ambassador with the 
words, ‘There are ships named Austerlitz and Friedland. Everyone is proud 
of memories of war glory. It is very simple’. ‘This holds true for all nations’, 
de Barante answered, ‘we also regard our victories with reverence’ [10]. 
Although the diplomat stressed an increase in the Russian Navy’s poten-
tial, he did not regard it as a distressing symptom. He emphasised that the 
Russian Baltic fleet had been blocked by ice seven months a year and thus it 
had not posed a threat. Moreover, de Barante believed the personnel of the 
Russian Navy to be unprofessional since they were recruited from far cor-
ners of the Empire and had had no experience in navigation. He thought that 
the only purpose the Navy could have served was fast transportation of the 
Russian troops to Europe [10, pp. 335—336]. 
In 1845, the Baltic question assumed an economic dimension in Russian-
French relations. Despite the complicated political relations between Russia 
and France, both countries were interested in bilateral trade. Russia exported 
agricultural produce to France — grain, flax, lard, flax seeds, sheep wool, 
hemp, wood, copper, and iron. France exported to Russia wine, champagne, 
salt, fruits, indigo dyes, silk, and gems. In 1827—1836, French annual im-
ports from Russia accounted for 20 million francs and annual exports to 
Russia for 8 million francs. The bilateral trade flows increased significantly 
in the following years. In 1837—1846, French annual imports accounted for 
35 million francs and exports to Russia for 13 million francs [8]. 
On June 19, 1845, the Russian government issued a decree introducing 
protective duties in favour of Russian vessels in the ports of the Baltic and 
the North Seas. Merchants of French Mediterranean cities did not welcome 
this initiative. In particular, La Patrie newspaper promoting the interests of 
French entrepreneurs called this decree absurd and interpreted it as an attack 
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against French commerce. The chambers of commerce of Rouen and Bor-
deaux claimed that the French marine commerce was in such a difficult situ-
ation that all complications in relations with Russia, despite their secondary 
significance, deserved undivided attention [12]. 
François Guizot, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the charge 
d'affaires in France, N. D. Kiselev, that the decree had forced the French 
government to take similar measures and introduce protective duties for 
French vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. Kiselev protested but the French 
government introduced the duties nevertheless. However, Guizot agreed 
with Kiselev that the most reasonable way to overcome disagreements would 
be concluding a treaty of commerce between France and Russia. 
At the end of February 1845, negotiations began. N. D. Kiselev repre-
sented Russia and baron de Barante represented France. The negotiations 
progressed very slowly, since neither party wanted to abolish the duties. In 
March 1846, after a meeting with the Ministers of Commerce and Finances, 
Guizot informed Kiselev that the French government deemed it impossible 
to abolish the relevant law, which had been adopted a year earlier. Guizot 
proposed establishing equal duties for vessels operating from the Baltic Sea 
and freezing the 1845 duties for vessels bound to or operating from the 
Black Sea. The negotiations almost collapsed, since Kiselev declared that, 
under the circumstances, there was no reason to continue. Finally, the Rus-
sian government rejected the French proposal to preserve differentiated du-
ties for French and Russian vessels. However, Russia did acknowledge the 
principle of mutuality in navigation and customs procedures. Moreover, the 
Russian government agreed to the French proposal to establish different du-
ties for the ports of the North and Baltic Seas, on the one hand, and the Med-
iterranean, Black, and Azov Seas, on the other. In August 1846, Kiselev re-
ceived final instructions from his government and, on September 16, 1846, 
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed. It was ratified on Octo-
ber 20. The key principle of the Treaty was that the port of origin determined 
the regime in the port of destination. Moreover, the Treaty guaranteed full 
mutuality, i. e. identical regimes for manufacturers from the North and the 
mutual preservation of differentiated duties for manufacturers from the 
South. The Russian government also stressed that, if a commercial agree-
ment between Russia and France was signed in the near future, the decree of 
June 19, 1846 on protective duties in favour of Russian vessels in the Baltic 
ports would be abrogated [5]. 
 
Conclusions 
 
From that point, the relations between France and Russia started to im-
prove. By a decree issued by Nicholas I on October 12, 1864, baron de Ba-
rante was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky for his contribution to the 
signing of the Russian-French Treaty of Commerce and Navigation [3]. 
Therefore, the Baltic factor was an important component in Russian-
French relations in the first half of the 19th century. Though being a secon-
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dary element, it always played an important role in finding solutions to com-
mon European problems, the Polish question as well as in developing eco-
nomic and commercial relations between Russia and France. Although the 
Baltic factor remained significant (for instance, during both world wars, 
when Russia and France were allies and the region turned into a theatre of 
war), since the first half of the 19th century, it has never played such an im-
portant role. In the current Russian-French relations, it is a minor factor. Of 
crucial important is the general framework for cooperation between Russia 
and the European Union, which embraces the major Baltic region countries. 
Thus, the Baltic question as a key factor of Russian-French relations is a 
thing of the past. 
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